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FITTING SQUARE PEGS INTO ROUND
HOLES: HOW RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
ADMISSIONS IS AN INADEQUATE AND
INEQUITABLE MEANS TO AN END

JUSTIN C. ADAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
We have all probably heard the old adage, “It’s like trying
to fit a square peg into a round hole.” With this statement, we
assume that because of the incompatibility of the shapes, the
square peg cannot fit into the round hole. If this is the case,
then how can the square peg fit into the round hole? There are
three possibilities: make the hole bigger, make the peg
smaller, or both. This simple quandary translates into the
dilemma created by race-based affirmative action schemes in
higher education admissions.
To illustrate the analogy, we must assign the roles of the
round hole and the square peg. The round hole is the
institutional goals and admission standards of the higher
education institution, and the square peg is the applicant
given preference and ultimately admitted by the race-based
affirmative action scheme. Both possibilities—making the
hole bigger and making the peg smaller—will overcome the
assumption of incompatibility. In other words, race-based
affirmative action forces institutions of higher education to
alter their institutional goals and admission standards, and the
*
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preference shown by the affirmative action scheme reduces
any true merit possessed by a preferentially-treated applicant.
Proponents of race-based affirmative action primarily
defend the practice as a means of curing instances of past
discrimination and attaining or maintaining diversity in the
educational setting.1 After assessment of these stated goals,
many similarities arguably exist. The most compelling
similarity, however, is that each goal is an “end,” and racebased affirmative action is simply a means to an end (or, in
this case, ends). Theoretically, at some point in time, we
should reach those ends. This paper, however, will show that
we will never reach those ends if race-based affirmative
action is the means to the ends and, further, that affirmative
action will only survive if we never reach the ends.
Part II will present a hypothetical situation of a law
school admissions director charged with selecting the final
two applicants to enter a class of one hundred students. Four
applicants remain, and the admissions director must employ
the law school’s affirmative action scheme in her selection.
Part III will analyze the history and legal framework of
affirmative action, including antidiscrimination laws and
Supreme Court decisions that have allowed the introduction
of race-based affirmative action and sustained the practice
despite its many critics.
Next, Part IV will present two theories that appeal to
proponents of race-based affirmative action, as possible
defenses of the practice. First, John Rawls’s hypothetical
“original position” will be evaluated. 2 Rawls suggests that
members of society should collectively agree upon principles
behind a “veil of ignorance,” without knowledge of their own
position in society relative to other members of society. 3
1

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14
(1978) (acknowledging the University’s special admissions program
aimed to increase minority enrollment); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,
265 (2003) (University’s policy has a stated goal of diversity); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003) (Law School’s policy aspires to
achieve diversity).
2
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–22 (Harvard Univ. Press
1971).
3
Id. at 136–42.
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Second, the extreme Critical Race Theory will be examined,
which holds that racism is permanent and the pursuit of racial
equality is futile.4
Finally, Part V will revisit the law school admissions
hypothetical presented in Part II, reveal the decisions made
by the admissions director based on the mandate to use the
law school’s affirmative action scheme, and highlight the
inequities that exist not only in the hypothetical, but also in
real-life scenarios analogous to the hypothetical. In addition,
this section will present possible alternatives to race-based
affirmative action. From these alternatives, a more realistic
and equitable cure will be chosen for the ills for which racebased affirmative action provides only a marginal treatment.
II. HYPOTHETICAL: THE UNENVIABLE POSITION OF THE LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSIONS DIRECTOR
Imagine an admissions director of a law school, vested
with the authority of selecting an entering law school class
from a pool of applicants much larger than the number of
students actually selected.5 She must base her decisions on
the institutional goals and admission standards formulated by
the law school faculty. The institutional goals include
maintaining the prestige of the law school, developing law
students into productive lawyers and members of society, and
giving the chance of a legal education to students from all
socio-economic backgrounds. Likewise, the admission
standards include exceptional performance in undergraduate
coursework, competitive Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) scores, and participation in a wide range of
extracurricular activities.
4

CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE XVI (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 1995).
5
This hypothetical uses a law school setting for no particular reason.
The same hypothetical could apply to the admissions process for any
institution of higher education. For purposes of simplicity, the authority of
selecting applicants has been vested in a single individual, but, in a real
world scenario of this type, several individuals who make up an
admissions committee often make these decisions.
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The entering class will consist of one hundred students
from across the country. Of the one hundred students, the
admissions director has already selected ninety-eight, and the
law school dean has approved their admission. From the once
large pool of applicants, there remain only four applicants for
the two seats that she must fill. Of the ninety-eight students
chosen thus far, none has an undergraduate grade point
average (GPA) lower than 3.7 (on a 4.0 scale), or an LSAT
score lower than 162 (on a 180 point scale). In addition, the
students chosen thus far are from all regions of the country,
and come from diverse socio-economic backgrounds.
Despite the admissions criteria described above, the dean
of the law school has instructed the admissions director to use
the school’s affirmative action policy when selecting from the
remaining applicants. The dean shares with her that the
president of the law school’s parent university has pressured
the law school to employ the affirmative action scheme for
these final selections, because the president of the parent
school does not feel comfortable with the racial distribution
of the students chosen thus far, despite the enormous
diversity of those selections in non-race areas.
The law school modeled its rarely-used affirmative action
policy after the University of Michigan Law School
affirmative action policy. The law school adopted the policy
with the primary objective of promoting a diverse student
body. As a member of the committee that formulated the
affirmative action policy, the admissions director knows that
the policy actually seeks to achieve racial diversity. Thus, the
dean directs the admissions director to evaluate the final four
applicants according to the admissions criteria used to
evaluate all other applicants, while giving preference to
applicants from disadvantaged racial groups. These groups
specifically include African Americans, Native Americans,
and Hispanics. Based on these modified criteria, the
admissions director begins evaluating the four remaining
applicants.6
6

The gender of each applicant has been revealed in their profile, but
for purposes of preference given to the applicants in the hypothetical,
gender is of no consequence.
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A. Applicant A
Applicant A is a twenty-two year old African American
male. He attended a small private liberal arts college, and
received a bachelor’s degree with a double major in Art and
Music. He earned an undergraduate grade point average of
3.4, and he made a 155 on the Law School Admission Test.
Applicant A seems to have a natural academic ability, but he
often earned lackluster undergraduate grades because he
spent more time in college participating in fraternity events
and traveling to away games as a member of the school’s
football and basketball teams.
Applicant A’s father works as a physician, and his mother
works as an attorney in private practice. He is a fourthgeneration college graduate, and will be a third-generation
law school student, if accepted. Applicant A used an athletic
scholarship to finance his undergraduate education. When
reviewing Applicant A’s application, the admissions director
read two letters of recommendation—one from his college
football coach, and the other from the governor of his home
state, a personal friend of Applicant A’s family and former
partner of his mother’s law firm.
B. Applicant B
Applicant B is a twenty year old Native American female.
She attended an Ivy League university, and received a
bachelor’s degree in Physics. She earned an undergraduate
grade point average of 3.4, and she made a 155 on the Law
School Admission Test. Instead of studying and applying
herself, Applicant B spent much of her time in college
traveling around the country participating in Native American
tradition festivals.
Applicant B’s father owns and operates several casinos,
and currently serves as chairman of the National Association
of Native American Gamers (NANA-Gs). Her mother serves
as the chief financial officer of the chain of casinos owned by
her family. Applicant B is a third-generation college
graduate, and her family covered all costs associated with her
undergraduate studies. She submitted recommendation letters
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from two world-renowned scholars who serve
distinguished professors at the Ivy League university.

as

C. Applicant C
Applicant C is a twenty-one year old Caucasian male. He
received a chemistry degree from a public state university.
Applicant C earned an undergraduate grade point average of
3.65, and he made a 160 on the Law School Admission Test.
Applicant C spent most of his undergraduate days in the
library or the chemistry lab. Distraction from a minor
learning disability required Applicant C to spend more time
studying and preparing for assignments than most of his
classmates.
Applicant C’s father works as a carpenter and his mother
is a homemaker. He is a first-generation college graduate,
although his father completed several trade school courses.
He worked throughout college to pay his living expenses, and
he used student loans to pay his tuition. Applicant C
submitted one letter of recommendation from a college
professor whose chemistry lab he worked in during his senior
year of college. His high school chemistry teacher, who took
a special interest in Applicant C’s ability in her chemistry
class, wrote his other letter of recommendation.
D. Applicant D
Applicant D is a twenty-two year old Caucasian male. He
attended community college for two years before entering a
regional public university near his home. He received a
degree in political science. Applicant D earned an
undergraduate grade point average of 3.4, and he made a 155
on the Law School Admission Test. He is a first-generation
college graduate, and devoted all of his collegiate free time to
studying, preparing for class, and tutoring sessions conducted
by his neighbor.
Throughout college, Applicant D lived with his mother, a
high school dropout, who works as a convenience store clerk.
Applicant D’s mother and father, high school sweethearts
who began living together at age eighteen, were never
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married. His father left his mother when he found out she was
pregnant with Applicant D, and he has never been a part of
Applicant D’s life. Applicant D paid his college expenses
through a Pell Grant and student loans. With his law school
application, Applicant D submitted letters of recommendation
from a college professor and the pastor of his church.
III. HISTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
A. The Beginning: From Simple Command to Difficult Legal
Questions
There is little doubt that racial discrimination and its
negative effects have plagued the United States for most of its
history. This country has witnessed both facially
discriminatory laws and facially neutral laws with
discriminatory effects. Despite the harsh reality of racism and
racial discrimination in this country, there still exists definite
disagreement about the degree of racial discrimination
present in the United States today, whether the traditional
majority can experience discrimination, and the best solution
to the problems posed by racial discrimination.
Those disagreements that Americans have about
discrimination are likely the same ones had, albeit more
definite, when President Kennedy issued Executive Order
10,925 on March 6, 1961.7 Among other things, the order
“prohibited discrimination and required contractors to pledge
to take affirmative action to ensure that applicants for
employment be considered without regard to race.”8
Certainly, those disagreements still existed when Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on July 2, 1964.9
Specifically, Title VI of the act states “No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
7

Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).
Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and
the Interpretations of its Legislative Intent By the Supreme Court, 29
AKRON L. REV. 291, 302 (1996) (emphasis added).
9
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (2000).
8
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origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 10
These are only two instances of the many attempts to
combat racial discrimination in the United States. Each
attempt to address the problem, however, is often
overshadowed by a more vigorous attempt to define the
problem. Many define it as racial discrimination against only
one group—African Americans. Likewise, those same people
see the solutions, such as those proposed by Executive Order
10,925 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, only as
mechanisms to eliminate discrimination against African
Americans.11
Plain language interpretation of the solutions, however,
may better illustrate the intent behind their introduction. First,
Executive Order 10,925 prohibited the federal government
from considering race as a factor in contracting or
employment decisions.12 Second, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 states that “no person” shall be discriminated
against on the basis of race. 13 Neither the Executive Order
nor Title VI mentions a particular race, or prescribes
protections to a particular race.
There is little doubt that most antidiscrimination
protections instituted during the Civil Rights movement were
for the benefit of African Americans. African Americans
benefited, however, simply because they had previously
lacked the protections that the antidiscrimination mechanisms
provided. Thus, they were only the immediate beneficiaries.
That does not mean that African Americans, or any other
racial group, are the only current beneficiaries, or that they
were ever considered the exclusive beneficiaries of any
antidiscrimination protections. The disagreements about
racial discrimination and the role of race-based affirmative
action in higher education admissions, particularly the
protections granted by the antidiscrimination laws of the
10
11
12
13

Id. (emphasis added).
See Brody, supra note 8, at 302–03.
Exec. Order 10,925, supra note 7.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 9.
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United States and the identity of the protected, are still
present today. The cases that follow best illustrate the
evolution of those disagreements.
B. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The Medical School at the University of California at
Davis (hereinafter “Medical School”) opened in 1968, and
admitted no African Americans, Hispanics, or Native
Americans through the general admission program in the
inaugural class.14 Within five years of admission of the first
class, the Medical School faculty developed a special
admissions program to increase the number of
“disadvantaged” students admitted.15 The Medical School
never defined the term “disadvantaged” and, despite its
original purpose, the special admission program evolved into
separate admissions program for select minority groups, and
ultimately into a racial quota system. 16 Applicants were
recommended to the special admissions program “until a
number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted.”17 In 1973
and 1974, the class size was 100 and the prescribed number
of special admissions was sixteen.18
Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to the Medical School
in 1973 and 1974.19 In both years, the Medical School
considered Bakke under the general admission program and
granted him an interview with a member of the admissions
14

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272 (1978).
Id.
16
Id. at 274–75. “Although disadvantaged whites applied to the
special program in large numbers, none received an offer of admission
through that process. Indeed, in 1974, at least, the special committee
explicitly considered only ‘disadvantaged’ special applicants who were
members of one of the designated minority groups.” Id. at 276 (citations
omitted). “For the class entering in 1973, the total number of special
applicants was 297, of whom 73 were white. In 1974, 628 persons applied
to the special committee, of whom 172 were white.” Id. at 275 n.5
(citations omitted).
17
Id. at 275.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 276.
15
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committee.20 After these interviews, the admissions
committee denied Bakke’s admission both years, despite the
availability of slots in the special admission program and the
admission of applicants through the special admissions
program with qualifications inferior to those of Bakke. 21
Bakke commenced a suit against the Medical School and
“alleged that the Medical School’s special admission program
operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his
race.”22 The trial court and the Supreme Court of California
agreed that the Medical School’s special admission program
operated as a racial quota, but the courts disagreed about
whether to compel the Medical School to admit Bakke. 23 The
Supreme Court of the United States “granted certiorari to
consider the important constitutional issue.”24
Applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court stated that
“in order to justify the use of a suspect classification, [the
Medical School] must show that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use
of the classification is ‘necessary…to the accomplishment’ of

20

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276.
Id. at 276–77.
22
Id. at 277–78. In addition to constitutional and statutory claims,
Bakke sought mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief compelling his
admission to the Medical School. Id. at 277. The Medical School “crosscomplained for a declaration that its special admissions program was
lawful.” Id. at 278.
23
Id. at 279. “[T]he trial court held the challenged program violative
of the Federal Constitution, the State Constitution, and Title VI. The court
refused to order Bakke’s admission, however, holding that he had failed
to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for
the existence of the special program.” Id. The California Supreme Court
“ruled that since Bakke had established that the University had
discriminated against him on the basis of his race, the burden of proof
shifted to the University to demonstrate that he would not have been
admitted even in the absence of the special admissions program.” Id. at
280 (citations omitted). The Medical School “conceded its inability to
carry that burden” and the California Supreme Court “amended its
opinion to direct that the trial court enter judgment ordering Bakke’s
admission to the Medical School.” Id. at 280–81 (citations omitted).
24
Id. at 281.
21
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its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” 25 The Court
evaluated each of the purported purposes of the special
admissions program—
(i) ‘reducing the historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical
schools and in the medical profession,’ (ii)
countering
the
effects
of
societal
discrimination, (iii) increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities
currently underserved, and (iv) obtaining the
benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse
student body
—under the strict scrutiny test.26 The Court found that the
Medical School advanced one purpose of the special
admissions program that warranted further review—attaining
a diverse student body.27 The Court held that the Medical
School’s “argument that [its quota system] is the only
effective means of serving the interest of diversity is
seriously flawed.”28 In other words, the Medical School’s
quota system was not the least restrictive means available to
promote diversity at the school.
Despite the Court’s position against the affirmative action
program at the Medical School, the door for race-based
affirmative action in higher education admissions remained
open after Bakke, and it remains open today.29 Nevertheless,
25

Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973)
(footnotes omitted); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).
26
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305–06.
27
Id. at 311. The Court stated: “This clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal an institution of higher education.” Id. at 311–12. The
Court went on to say, however, “the question remains whether the
program’s racial classification is necessary to promote this interest.” Id. at
314–15.
28
Id. at 315.
29
Id. at 265. The institution has a compelling interest in reducing
past effects of racial discrimination if it presents “judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.” Id. at
307. “It may be assumed that in some situations a State’s interest in
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the most important language of the Bakke opinion is the
Court’s warnings against the use of special admissions
programs based on suspect classifications. 30 An institution
that considers the use of a race-based affirmative action
scheme should, after a true evaluation of the Court’s
warnings, logically conclude that employing such a scheme
lacks prudence. Using the Bakke framework, however,
institutions still attempt to try their hand at employing
successful race-based affirmative action programs. Two
attempts by the University of Michigan undergraduate and
law school, respectively, are outlined below.
C. Gratz v. Bollinger
Jennifer Gratz applied for admission to the College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts at the University of
Michigan (hereinafter “University”) in 1995.31 The
University delayed her application and ultimately denied her
admission.32 As a member of a class action lawsuit against
the University, Gratz claimed that the University treated
members of certain “racial or ethnic groups, including
Caucasian . . . less favorably on the basis of race in
considering their application for admission.”33 The
University’s admissions guidelines, including its use of racial
facilitating the health care of its citizens is sufficiently compelling to
support the use of a suspect classification.” Id. at 310. “[T]he attainment
of a diverse student body…clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal
for an institution of higher education.” Id. at 311–12.
30
See id. at 298 (acknowledging that the following “are serious
problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself[:]” (1)
“Courts may be asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual
members of a particular group in order to advance the groups general
interest[;]” (2) “preferential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success
without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to
individual worth[; and] (3) there is a measure of inequity in forcing
innocent persons in [Bakke’s] position to bear the burdens of redressing
grievances not of their making.”) (citations omitted).
31
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 253. The certified class consisted of applicants with this
status “for all academic years from 1995 forward.” Id. at 252–53.
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preferences, evolved over the period relevant to the class
litigation.34
In 1995, the University considered race among other
factors in making admissions decisions.35 The University
considered African Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans as underrepresented minorities, and it did not
deny that it “admits virtually every qualified . . . applicant
from these groups.”36 In 1997, the University modified its
admissions procedure, allowing applicants to receive “points
for underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic
disadvantage, or attendance in at a high school with a
predominately underrepresented minority population, or
underrepresentation in the unit to which the student was
applying (for example, men who sought to pursue a career in
nursing).”37
In 1998, the University once again altered its admissions
procedure in favor of a “selection index, on which an
applicant could score a maximum of 150 points.”38 Each
applicant received points based on certain factors, including
“high school grade point average, standardized test scores,
academic quality of applicant’s high school, strength or
weakness of high school curriculum, in-state residency,
alumni relationship, personal essay, and personal
achievement or leadership.”39 In addition, “under a
‘miscellaneous’ category, an applicant was entitled to 20
points based upon his or her membership in an
underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.”40 The
University used the selection index during the 1999 and 2000
academic years, and “every applicant from an
underrepresented racial or ethnic group was awarded 20
points.”41
34

See id. at 253–57 (analyzing the University admissions guidelines
from 1995 through 2000).
35
Id. at 254.
36
Id.
37
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 256.
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Applying strict scrutiny and the Bakke framework, the
District Court concluded that “a racially and ethnically
diverse
student
body . . . constitutes
a
compelling
42
governmental interest.” The District Court determined that
the selection index “is a narrowly tailored means of achieving
the University’s interest in the educational benefits that flow
from a racially and ethnically diverse student body.” 43 In
addition, the District Court held that “[t]he award of 20 points
for membership in an underrepresented minority
group . . . was not the functional equivalent of a quota
because minority candidates were not insulated from review
by virtue of those points.”44
The class action members appealed the District Court’s
judgment, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the
appeal en banc on the same day as the appeal of Grutter v.
Bollinger.45 The Sixth Circuit released an opinion in Grutter,
but not in Gratz.46 The class litigants in Gratz asked the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to review the
constitutionality of race-based admission standards, despite
the fact that the Court of Appeals had not entered judgment in
the case.47 The Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari.48
Using strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court evaluated the
special admissions program employed by the University. 49
Gratz and the other class litigants argued that “diversity as a
basis for employing racial preferences is simply too openended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling
interest capable of supporting narrowly-tailored means.”50
The Court rejected these arguments, and the class members
“alternatively argue[d] that even if the University’s interest in
42

Id. at 258 (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822–24
(E.D. Mich. 2000)).
43
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 258 (citing Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 827).
44
Id. (citing Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 828).
45
Id. at 259.
46
Id. at 259–60.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 249.
49
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
50
Id. at 268.
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diversity can constitute a compelling state interest, the
District Court erroneously concluded that the University’s
use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is
narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest.” 51 The Court
agreed that “the University’s policy, which automatically
distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to
guarantee admission, to every single ‘underrepresented
minority’ applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly
tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity that
respondents claim justifies their program.” 52
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court makes it
obvious that the University did not adequately understand or
apply the Bakke opinion from twenty-five years earlier. The
concurring opinions, however, present a more critical
assessment of the University’s policy, and perhaps a more
accurate assessment of race-based affirmative action
programs, in general.53 As Justice O’Connor wrote, the
University’s “mechanized selection index score, by and large,
automatically determines the admissions decision for each
applicant,” and it does not “provide for a meaningful
individualized review of applicants.”54 Likewise, and perhaps
holding the most anti-affirmative action view of the Court,
Justice Thomas wrote that he “would hold that a State’s use
of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is
categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.”55
D. Grutter v. Bollinger
The Supreme Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger,
involving the racial preference scheme employed by the
University of Michigan Law School (hereinafter “Law
School”), on the same day as Gratz. The Law School’s
admissions policy required consideration of criteria beyond
an applicant’s grades and test scores.56 The Law School
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
See id. at 276–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003).
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admitted that “[t]he policy aspires to achieve that diversity
which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and
thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its
parts,” and that “[t]he policy does not restrict the types of
diversity contributions eligible for substantial weight in the
admissions process.”57 The Law School admitted, however,
that the admissions policy reaffirmed a longstanding
commitment to racial and ethnic diversity. 58 Specifically, the
Law School intended to lend special preference to African
Americans, Native Americans, and Hispanics. 59
The Law School referred to the effect of its admissions
policy as the enrollment of a “critical mass” of
underrepresented minority students. 60 The Law School
argued that by enrolling this critical mass, it sought to ensure
that those admitted under the affirmative action policy made
“unique contributions to the character of the Law School.”61
The Law School defended its policy of considering an
applicant’s race among other factors while not admitting a
certain percentage or number of minority students. 62 The
dean of the Law School testified, however, that for some
applicants race may play no role, while it may be the
determinative factor for other applicants. 63
Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, applied to the
Law School in 1996.64 The Law School initially placed
Grutter on a waiting list, and subsequently rejected her
application.65 Joined by others similarly situated, Grutter filed
suit against the Law School and alleged that the Law School
rejected her application because of her race. She alleged that
the Law School used race as a predominant factor, giving
applicants who belong to certain minority groups “a
significantly greater chance of admission than students with
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 316.
Id.
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similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.”66 The
District Court concluded that the Law School’s use of race as
a factor in admissions decisions was unlawful, but the Court
of Appeals disagreed.67 The Supreme Court “granted
certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of
Appeals on a question of national importance: Whether
diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly
tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to
public universities.”68
The Supreme Court held that “the Law School has a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.” 69
The Court also stated that the Law School properly used its
affirmative action policy to attain a diverse student body, and
that the presumption of good faith exists, unless there is a
showing to the contrary.70 Further, the Supreme Court held
that the Law School’s admissions policy was narrowly
tailored because it only considered race as a “plus” factor,
and that the Law School “engages in a highly individualized,
holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to
a diverse educational environment.”71
Regardless of the nuances of its operation, compared to
other invalidated race-based affirmative action schemes, this
admissions policy survived because the Law School
presented it as a less threatening scheme than those found in
Bakke or Gratz. As Chief Justice Rehnquist notes in his
dissent, however, “[s]tripped of its ‘critical mass’ veil, the
Law School’s program is revealed as a naked effort to
achieve racial balancing.”72 The Chief Justice and the other
dissenting Justices pointed out the primary weakness of the
“critical mass” argument—theoretically, it should produce an
equal number of each minority group, but it actually favors
66

Id. at 317.
Id. at 321.
68
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322.
69
Id. at 328.
70
Id. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–19).
71
Id. at 333–41.
72
Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in this part of his dissent.
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African Americans.73 After much discussion, the dissenters
determined that the Law School not only failed to “explain
the phenomenon,” but it “attempt[ed] to obscure it.”74 This
type of obscurity clouds the merit of any race-based
affirmative action scheme in higher education admissions.
IV. APPEALING THEORIES TO PROPONENTS OF RACE-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Proponents of race-based affirmative action have several
legal, philosophical, and jurisprudential theories to rely upon
in support of continuing the practice of giving preference to
certain minority racial groups. Often, the theories are
presented in broad terms, without specific mention of racebased affirmative action.75 It is possible (perhaps desired),
however, to evaluate the principles of race-based affirmative
action by using a particular theory, and affirming the merit of
the practice by doing so. This section will discuss two
theories that proponents may use in support of race-based
affirmative action, as well as present this author’s critique of
each theory, with respect to race-based affirmative action.
A. John Rawls’s Original Position
John Rawls refined the notion of the “original position”
as a means by which members of a society will agree upon
73

Id. at 380–85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice
presents the admissions disparities among each minority group and then
states that the Law School offers “no race-specific reasons for such
disparities. Instead they simply emphasize the importance of achieving
‘critical mass,’ without any explanation of why that concept is applied
among the three underrepresented minority groups . . . .” Id. at 381
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice concludes that the
different numbers “come only as a result of substantially different
treatment among the three underrepresented minority groups . . . .” Id. at
382 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
74
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 385 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
75
Rawls’s “original position” does not refer to affirmative action
specifically. Critical Race Theory (CRT) is a general jurisprudential
school that directly addresses affirmative action, but not all CRT theorists
support the current form of affirmative action.
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the principles that will govern the society. 76 Members of
society must agree upon these principles without knowledge
of the “qualities, attributes, privileges, and abilities each
person might hold.”77 In other words, members of society,
while beneath a “veil of ignorance,” must decide the
principles that will ultimately govern the society. 78 Rawls
contends that the original position sets up a fair procedure for
society to agree upon just principles.79 He views this result as
“justice as fairness,” not necessarily because justice and
fairness are equivalents of each other, but because the method
of achieving justice—through the original position—is a fair
method.80
Obviously, Rawls’s formulation assumes that there are
right answers; the actors in the original position will decide
upon certain basic principles, regardless of the time, location,
or frequency of the assessment. According to Rawls, the
actors in the original position would agree upon the following
principles of justice:
[First,] each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all. [Second,] social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle, and (b) attached to offices and
76

See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A
RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Princeton
Univ. Press 1977) (outlining the evolution of Rawls’s “original position”
theory). Rawls had discussed the “original position” and similar theories
in previous works, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS and DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE and
made adjustments before reaching the final version presented in A
THEORY OF JUSTICE. See id.
77
Chris Chambers Goodman, Beneath the Veil: Corollaries on
Diversity and Critical Mass Scholarships from Rawls’ Original Position
on Justice, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 285, 287 (2007).
78
RAWLS, supra note 2, at 136–37.
79
Id. at 136.
80
Id. at 12–13.
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positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.81
The general conception of Rawls’s theory more adequately
summarizes the principles that will result from the original
position framework: “All social primary goods—liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of selfrespect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of
the least favored.”82
Even using only this brief summation of Rawls’s theory,
the weaknesses of the theory, in general, and in relation to its
appeal to proponents of race-based affirmative action can be
exposed. First, Rawls’s hypothesis may well be too
hypothetical to a point that it is of little or no use. Second, the
original position actors’ minimal knowledge is sufficient for
the formulation of biased positions. Third, even if the original
position actors decide upon the two basic principles identified
by Rawls, race-based affirmative action is not consistent with
those principles.
Rawls admits that the original position “is not . . . thought
of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a
primitive condition of culture.”83 Instead, he suggests that we
may understand the original position “as a purely
hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain
conception of justice.”84 A hypothesis allows for the
assumption of certain facts as truth for the sake of argument.
In addition, the potential outcomes of a complex theory, such
as Rawls’s theory of justice, may be evaluated using a
hypothetical framework. Rawls’s original position, however,
not only allows for assumption of certain facts, but it limits
the assessment of those assumptions beneath the veil of
ignorance. Thus, the framework is too hypothetical because it
is narrowed to the point of no actual negotiation among the
actors, the actors cannot act behind such a veil of ignorance,
81
82
83
84
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and it does not allow for changed circumstances in the
society.
Second, despite the veil of ignorance, the actors in the
original position “know the general facts about human
society.”85 This means that the original position actors
“understand the political affairs and the principles of
economic theory; they know the basis of social organization
and the laws of human psychology.” 86 It seems logical that,
even with only this minimal knowledge, the actors in the
original position can deduce certain other knowledge that
would permit them to form biases and other self-interested
positions within the negotiations. Thus, “[t]he parties could
not in principle possess all and only the knowledge Rawls
imputes to them[,]” and furthermore, “the impossibility is
logical, not merely genetic.” 87
Finally, even assuming that Rawls’s theory is logical and
useful, the use of race-based affirmative action does not
correlate with the theory. Proponents of race-based
affirmative action in higher education would argue that the
practice conforms to the principles of justice prescribed by
Rawls because it distributes scarce educational resources to
those most in need of them—members of minority groups
who are traditionally disadvantaged because of their race.
The assumption, however, that only members of minority
groups face disadvantages, does not hold. Thus, the theory
could only correlate to distribution of scarce educational
resources to all disadvantaged persons, not only those of
particular racial groups.
B. Critical Race Theory
Critical Race Theory is a “positivist body of scholarship,
primarily created by people of color, aimed at breaking down

85

Id. at 137.
Id.
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ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A
RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1977).
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the barriers of racism ‘institutionalized in and by law.’” 88
Critical Race Theory has several basic themes or features,
and the most common is that racism is endemic in America.
In other words, members of the Critical Race Theory
movement see racism as a normal feature of our society. In
addition, Critical Race Theory attempts to attack and
mischaracterize liberal ideals, such as those presented by
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. 89 In doing so, subscribers
of Critical Race Theory conflict with the notion of liberals,
that “the battle against racism should be fought on all fronts,
including legal reform, and that we should do our best to
eliminate discrimination in as many contexts as
possible . . . and enact affirmative action schemes in the hope
that they withstand constitutional muster.” 90
Despite the fact that Critical Race Theory presents a more
extreme view of racism and discrimination than traditional
liberalism and the Critical Legal Studies movement, not all
members of the Critical Race Theory movement support
affirmative action as the solution to racism. 91 This should
come as no surprise because the major tenet of Critical Race
Theory does not correspond to the purported goals of
affirmative action. In fact, race-based affirmative action
purports to remedy discrimination and promote diversity.
Critical Race Theorists, however, have become complacent
88

Justin P. Walsh, Swept Under the Rug: Integrating Critical Race
Theory into the Legal Debate on the use of Race, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 673, 674 (2008) (quoting Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical
Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899 (1995)).
89
See Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race
Theory, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 512–16 (1997) (explaining the
need to focus the Critical Race Theory critique of liberalism).
90
Id. at 514.
91
See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative
Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 893, 905 (1994); Richard Delgado, Affirmative
Action as a Majoritarian Device: Do You Really Want to be a Role
Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1226 (1991) (advising minorities to
“demystify, interrogate, and destabilize affirmative action” as a scheme
“designed by others to promote their purposes, not ours”). Cf. Robin D.
Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a Dangerous Liaison, 101
YALE L.J. 1631, 1647 (1992) (showing how affirmative action provides
for reparation, economic efficiency, and “improved opportunities for
integration and diversity”).
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with the presence of racism in our society. Therefore, Critical
Race Theorists should not support race-based affirmative
action because of the inconsistent goals of race-based
affirmative action and Critical Race Theory.
With the stated goals of affirmative action in conflict with
the extreme position of Critical Race Theory, the argument in
support of affirmative action becomes circular. If affirmative
action reaches its goals of remedying past discrimination and
promoting diversity, then it is no longer needed. At that point
in time, assessments (such as higher education admissions)
would be made without the effects of preferences from
affirmative action schemes. If those preference-free
assessments could not provide racial balancing, then the need
for affirmative action would rise again, and some minority
group (or groups) would receive the benefits of the
preferences given by race-based affirmative action.
The need for affirmative action will arise because
diversity has been lost, again creating at least one “majority”
group and at least one “minority” group. The minority group
would once begin to receive the benefits of the preferences
given by affirmative action. The post-diversity minority and
majority groups are not necessarily the same as the prediversity minority and majority groups. This shows that racebased affirmative action can only exist in an environment of
non-diversity, contrary to at least one of its stated goals.
Thus, while Critical Race Theory supports the advancement
of members of minority racial groups, it does little to advance
the cause of race-based affirmative action.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A MEANS TO
AN END IN HIGHER EDUCATION
A. Revisiting the Law School Admissions Director
With much reservation and urging from the dean of the
Law School and president of the University, the admissions
director chooses Applicant A and Applicant B as the final
two members of the law school’s entering class. The
mandated use of the law school’s affirmative action policy
primarily influenced the admissions director’s choices. While
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personally opposed to the affirmative action policy and the
results that it produces, the admissions director relied upon
the preceding cases and theories to make her decision.
Even though the admissions director understands the
rationale presented by each case and theory in support of
race-based affirmative action, she still has difficulty
accepting the inequitable impact that it has on those involved
in the application and selection process. The admissions
director shares this logical position with many others. While
cognizant of the negative effects of racial discrimination, she
understands that race-based affirmative action promotes
discrimination against members of two groups in particular—
those with superior merit and those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged. In the hypothetical, Applicant C
and Applicant D occupy those positions, respectively.
This situation is often referred to as “reverse
discrimination,” but it can simply be referred to as
discrimination.92 Using a term such as reverse discrimination
accepts the argument that the practice of discrimination is
reserved for only certain people or groups, and that reverse
discrimination is a different practice reserved for other people
or groups. On the other hand, Consistent use of the term
“discrimination” reinforces the argument that all individuals
may suffer the same harms of discrimination, and that all
individuals deserve the same protections of antidiscrimination
laws.
B. The New Assignment: Finding a Better Means
Luckily, the Admissions Director has a chance to make a
difference. She has been chosen as a member of a national
task force—Coalition of Lawyers & Other Race-Based Legal
Institutions Necessitating Diversity (COLOR BLIND). The
task force must propose an alternative to race-based
affirmative action that will eliminate the inequitable
preferences given by race-based affirmative action schemes.
92
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The task force members must individually evaluate possible
alternatives, and the task force will compile the
recommendations of each member. The admissions director
has evaluated many alternatives, and the most appealing
alternatives are discussed below. The task force should adopt
the two-fold approach because it is the most adequate and
equitable alternative to race-based affirmative action.
1. Civil Disobedience as a Temporary Answer
Civil disobedience comes in various forms. For purposes
of this paper, civil disobedience is defined as “a political
protest over an unjust law or policy committed by violating
law conscientiously, openly, and nonviolently, with respect
for the interests of others and with acceptance of
punishment.”93 Societies have practiced civil disobedience in
all periods of time, and its presence is arguably universal.
Civil disobedience was practiced in biblical times,
perhaps most notably in the story of Shadrach, Meshach, and
Abednego.94 King Nebuchadnezzar created an idol and
demanded the people under his rule to worship the idol, or
face the consequence of being thrown into a burning
furnace.95 Willing to accept the king’s punishment because of
their faithfulness to God, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego
refused to worship the idol.96 In other words, the three were
disobedient to the commands of the king because they viewed
his command as unjust, or in conflict with the law of God,
and they were willing to accept the consequences of their
disobedience.
Americans have practiced civil disobedience throughout
the country’s history, and “[t]he sit-in, in its various forms, is
the most common type of civil disobedience practiced in

93

Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil
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America today.”97 Sit-ins are either a direct98 or an indirect99
form of civil disobedience. Arguably, civil rights activists in
the 1960’s, protesting racial discrimination in public places
such as buses, lunch counters, and restaurants, conducted the
most prominent sit-ins in the United States. 100 While one may
think of sit-ins as the most popular form of civil disobedience
in the United States, civil disobedience can take many forms.
For example, and most relevant to the current topic, civil
disobedience has been advocated as a means of minimizing
or eliminating the effects of discrimination through racebased affirmative action.101
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger,102 Dr. Martin Carcieri, a lawyer and professor of
Political Science, wrote an article advocating the use of civil
disobedience to offset the effects of race-based affirmative
action.103 In Carcieri’s opinion, professors such as himself
“who grade and/or write reference letters for law school
applicants each year are morally permitted to distort their
assessments, based on race, in order to offset the racial
discrimination practiced at institutions like [the University of
Michigan Law School].”104 Carcieri bases the moral
permissibility of the proposed lawless act on four broad
97

Bruce Ledewitz, Perspectives on the Law of the American Sit-in,
16 WHITTIER L. REV. 499, 502 (1995).
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Id. (defining indirect civil disobedience as “the violation of a law
acceptable, or at least neutral, in itself in order to oppose some other
policy”).
100
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inquiries: (1) the damage done to the interests of others; (2)
the purpose of the disobedience; (3) the actors’ willingness to
accept punishment; and (4) the form of government under
which the disobedience occurs. 105 Despite these inquiries into
the moral permissibility of a lawless act, Carcieri’s proposal
to offset the discriminatory effects of affirmative action
through civil disobedience is flawed.
While Carcieri’s proposal may seem appealing at first
glance, its major flaw is the inability to account for the
unintended consequences that may flow from the civil
disobedience. These unintended consequences arise when
professors distort the assessments of students in order to
mitigate the discriminatory effects of race-based affirmative
action at a specific institution, but the student attempts to use
her grades or reference letters at another institution which
employs no such scheme, or the student attempts to use the
distorted assessments for any other purpose. Carcieri partially
admits the weakness of his proposal in this respect. 106 This
illustrates the practical weakness of civil disobedience as an
alternative to race-based affirmative action, and should
eliminate consideration of it as an alternative.
2. Using Merit as the Ultimate Indicator
The central tenet underlying the use of merit in higher
education admissions is that an institution admits (or denies)
an applicant based on earned qualities. Supporters of merit
view non-meritorious admissions programs, such as racebased affirmative action, as a means of giving an unearned
105

Id. at 367–68 (citing KENT GREENAWALT, A CONTEXTUAL
APPROACH TO DISOBEDIENCE, IN AM. SOCY. FOR POLITICAL AND LEG.
PHIL., POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION, 332, 350 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Champman eds., Atherton Press 1970)).
106
Id. at 377. Carcieri points out that “this objection is much weaker
with respect to law school reference letters than with respect to grades”
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admissions committees, all of which will be seeking minority
students.”Id. He goes on to argue that those injured by the act of civil
disobedience should seek relief from the institution which caused the
disobedient actor to act, instead of seeking relief from the disobedient
actor. Id.
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advantage to undeserving applicants. On the contrary, most
supporters of admissions preferences afforded by race-based
affirmative action “contend that standards of merit are
socially constructed to maintain the power of dominant
groups.”107 These opponents of solely merit-based
assessments view admissions preferences as a necessary
means of offsetting the primary effect of merit—maintaining
white dominance.108 This extreme view, held most
prominently by the Critical Race Theorists, is an inapposite
view of merit. There are, however, concerns with using merit
as the ultimate indicator in higher education admissions.
The foremost flaw of merit is a definitional one.
Depending upon the varying institutional goals, the definition
of merit may also vary. If an institution has a goal of
recruiting talented minds, then the institution would likely
define merit based on an individual’s academic
performance.109 Likewise, if an institution has a goal of
producing superior athletic teams, then the institution would
likely define merit in athletic terms. Even if the institution
had the primary institutional goal of promoting diversity, the
institution may not necessarily use race as a determinative
factor. The definitional problem faced with merit would also
arise with respect to diversity. Thus, the institution must
define the type of diversity it seeks to achieve, followed by
the type of merit it will use to attain the desired diversity.
Despite this definitional variance, it is highly unlikely that the
definition of merit would translate into the use of race as a
factor.
In addition to the definitional flaw, the use of merit as the
ultimate indicator in higher education admissions also
presents qualitative and quantitative limits. The qualitative
limit advances the definitional flaw to an additional inquiry.
Once an institution defines its goals, and ultimately reaches
its definition of merit, then the qualitative limits of merit are
107
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realized. Therefore, while admissions standards may require
purely academic assessments, they should also require
assessments of non-academic, abstract qualities such as
“skill-empathy,
communication,
perseverance,
and
cooperation.”110 Furthermore, the quantitative limits are then
realized because merit requires the quantification of its
features, and quantification of abstract qualities may be
difficult or impossible.
Because of these flaws, institutions should be cautious
when using merit as the ultimate indicator in higher education
admissions, but the use of merit in higher education
admissions should continue. The total absence of merit from
admissions considerations allows for the arbitrary preference
of students with inferior merit who fall into a suspect racial
group, but face no economic disadvantages, over students
with superior merit. This illustrates the inequity of race-based
affirmative action programs on non-minority students with
superior merit, relative to minority students who have inferior
merit, but demonstrate no socio-economic disadvantage.
Applicant C and Applicant A occupy these respective
positions in the hypothetical.
Thus, institutions should use merit as a factor in higher
education admissions, but not the factor. On the contrary,
institutions should not arbitrarily consider race in the
admissions process. The elimination of discrimination in
higher education admissions, however, does not eliminate
disadvantages across all racial lines. Therefore, a suitable
alternative to race-based affirmative action needs to be
formulated.
3. Achieving Adequacy and Equity: A Twofold Approach
America needs to take affirmative action toward equality
as much today as at any time in her history. There exists,
however, a greater need for equality and fairness in our
110

Toby Egan, Critical Race Theory’s Individual Flaw, 67 UMKC
L. REV. 661, 667 (1999) (citing Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Thirteenth
Chronicle: Legal Formalism and Law’s Discontents, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1105, 1141 (1997)).
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approach to affirmative action. We must renew our pledge to
affirmative action. This renewed pledge must see no color,
but it must seek justice and equality for the most
disadvantaged individuals of society, regardless of their
color. In addition, society must ensure that those who face the
greatest disadvantages are shown compassion and preference
long before they attempt to gain admission to an institution of
higher education. Thus, the new approach to affirmative
action must be disadvantage-based, and it must include an
early intervention component.
Affirmative action in higher education admissions must
be disadvantage-based as opposed to race-based. Race-based
affirmative action programs attempt to operate under the
guise of giving preference to traditionally disadvantaged
groups. The Medical School certainly made this attempt in
Bakke.111 In moving forward, society should learn from such
failed attempts. In doing so, society will find that the
administration of affirmative action programs that assist
applicants based on socio-economic disadvantage will
address the “over-breadth of the coverage and definition of
favored groups.”112
In addressing the over-breadth problem posed by racebased affirmative action, all higher education applicants will
benefit. First, minority applicants who face no socioeconomic disadvantage will benefit because they will
ultimately gain admission to an institution more suitable to
their own needs and abilities. The preference given by racebased affirmative action programs often forces those
applicants into an institution that will subject them to failure.
In the hypothetical, Applicant A and Applicant B are,
perhaps, forced into this failure.
Second, non-minority applicants who face socioeconomic disadvantages will benefit because they will now
have an opportunity to compete on a playing field otherwise
tilted in favor of the most advantaged members of society.
111
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These applicants are doubly-disadvantaged under race-based
affirmative action programs—they face socio-economic
disadvantages, as well as racial discrimination perpetrated by
the race-based affirmative action programs. In the
hypothetical, Applicant D faces this double-disadvantage.
Third, minority students who face socio-economic
disadvantage will perhaps benefit most from disadvantagebased affirmative action because they are most harmed by the
over-breadth of race-based affirmative action. With racebased affirmative action, an institution may prefer a minority
applicant with no socio-economic disadvantage over a
disadvantaged minority applicant with the same or superior
credentials. Race-based affirmative action schemes allow this
because the scheme can justify the action, regardless of
whether society views the action as justified.
In addition to transforming race-based affirmative action
into disadvantage-based affirmative action, we must develop
early intervention strategies to address the problems faced by
the disadvantaged who may ultimately receive affirmative
action preference. This approach has been termed the “root
cause strategy”.113 As Peter Schuck writes, such a strategy
“emphasize[s] the desperate need to improve the schools that
low-income children attend, provide remedial assistance to
those who cannot progress without it, expand job training for
low-skill workers who cannot otherwise compete in the labor
market, and help minority entrepreneurs build stable,
competitive businesses.”114
Despite its appeal, society must approach an alternative
such as the “root cause strategy” with caution. Particularly,
any early intervention program implemented must itself be
disadvantage-based and racially neutral. There is no need to
implement such programs, if they will only maintain the
status quo. Some critics are pessimistic toward such
113
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strategies.115 If the energy of these critics and the supporters
of race-based affirmative action would join forces in
achieving equity in higher education admissions, then they
could implement an effective early intervention program with
ease. Without coupling early intervention and disadvantagebased affirmative action, however, we will simply continue to
provide interim treatment to a disease that deserves a cure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The debate about race-based affirmative action has raged
since President Kennedy used the words in Executive Order
10,925 in 1961.116 Frederick Douglass, however, made a
wiser and more prudential statement to a group of
abolitionists in 1865. Those who find themselves in the racebased affirmative action debate must consider Douglass’s
statement, quoted by Justice Clarence Thomas in his dissent
in Grutter v. Bollinger:
In regard to the colored people, there is always
more that is benevolent, I perceive, than just,
manifested towards us. What I ask for the
negro is not benevolence, not pity, not
sympathy, but simply justice. The American
people have always been anxious to know
what they shall do with us…. I have had but
one answer from the beginning. Do nothing
with us! Your doing with us has already
played the mischief with us. Do nothing with
us! If the apples will not remain on the tree of
their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at
the core, if they are early ripe and disposed to
fall, let them fall! … And if the negro cannot
stand on his own legs, let him fall also. All I
ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own
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2011

Fitting Square Pegs Into Round Holes

157

legs! Let him alone! … Your interference is
doing him positive injury.117
Justice Thomas continued his dissent by incorporating
Douglass’s call for justice into the higher education
affirmative action framework before the Court in Grutter. As
Justice Thomas pointed out, “[n]o one would argue that a
university could set up a lower general admissions standard
and then impose heightened requirements only on black
applicants. Similarly, a university may not maintain a high
admission standard and grant exemptions to favored
races.”118
As a society, the focus must shift to those who face real
disadvantages, regardless of the color of their skin.
Furthermore, our actions must be proactive and preventative,
rather than reactive and preferential. If, instead, we continue
to use race-based affirmative action programs that run afoul
of traditional notions of fairness and justice, then we are
simply forcing square pegs into round holes.
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Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349–50 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
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